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I. INTRODUCTION
A
lthough there is a substantial body of literature on macroeco-
nomic policies in Latin America, the role of fiscal and monetary
policies as tools to stabilize the business cycle has not received
much attention. This is understandable in light of the fact that during
the last thirty years, both fiscal and monetary policies were responsible,
to a large degree, for the region’s history of macroeconomic and financial
instability. Rather than being tools for the stabilization of the business
cycle, they were typically managed in a way that amplified the effects of
shocks on output and interest rates.
Therefore, the literature on macroeconomic policy has concentrated
on the role played by the monetary and fiscal authorities in the region’s
history of balance of payments and financial crises and their quest to re-
establish macroeconomic order and stability. Macroeconomic policies
were mostly procyclical, as they fueled an overheated economy in the
run-up to the crises and were strongly tightened when the external con-
straints became binding.1
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During the 1980s, the financial fragility associated with the debt
crisis implied that, in Latin America, monetary and fiscal policies could
not be oriented toward smoothing the business cycle. Balance sheet
problems implied that countries were in a particularly vulnerable situa-
tion, so negative shocks translated into considerable instability, loss of
credibility and, therefore, the need to implement procyclical policies
when faced with negative shocks. Thus, macroeconomic policies were
geared toward solving persistent solvency, balance of payments, and
inflationary problems.2
During this period, it became clear that increasing the role of the
private sector while the size of the public sector was reduced was a nec-
essary condition for sustainable growth.3 As a consequence, a
comprehensive reform effort was implemented in many countries. An
important objective of this reform process was the restoration of
macroeconomic stability. Therefore, monetary policy experienced sub-
stantial changes during this period. The main factors that influenced
the transformation of monetary policy in Latin America were:
First, mounting evidence from the region’s experience with high
rates of inflation, and hyperinflation in some cases, that showed the
large costs of inflation in terms of output growth, income distribu-
tion, and financial sector deepening. The increased awareness
regarding the high costs of the monetary authority not focusing on
price stability gradually closed the door to the pressures for expan-
sionary monetary policy aimed at “fueling economic growth.”
Second, after years of fiscal mismanagement, stabilization efforts
were anchored on a significant strengthening of public finances and a
trend toward improving fiscal institutions, eliminating pressures for
monetizing public sector deficits. However, it should be noted that
results on the fiscal front have differed significantly among countries in
the region. In particular, after positive developments in the initial stages
of the reform process, many countries have not been able to carry out
further fiscal consolidation, leading to an increase in the public debt-to-
GDP ratio even in times of positive economic performance.4
Third, the independence gained by the regional central banks gave
incentives for a further consolidation of public finances, since the mone-
tary authorities were forbidden to finance public sector deficits. Central
bank independence was a signal that Latin America was committed toECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 39
institutionalize the initial move toward responsible fiscal and monetary
policies. However, in many cases, of which Mexico is an example, the
independence was granted during a period when predetermined
exchange rate regimes were in place. This last element severely curtailed
monetary autonomy, as the establishment of a predetermined exchange
rate and the opening of the capital account precluded the independent
implementation of monetary policy.
Thus, the fourth element that shaped the recent evolution of
monetary policy in the region was the balance of payments cum
financial crises of the 1990s, which highlighted the difficulties of
fixing the exchange rates in a world of highly mobile capital. The col-
lapse of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992, the
Mexican crisis of 1994 to 1995, and the subsequent crises in emerg-
ing markets motivated several countries in the region to abandon
their predetermined exchange rate systems and adopt a free-floating
regime. The adoption of floating regimes proved to be the other big
turning point for monetary policy in the region. Central bank auton-
omy and fiscal discipline eliminated fiscal influence on monetary
policies, and a free-floating exchange rate opened the door for the
monetary authorities to implement monetary policy with price sta-
bility as its primary objective.
While these elements were put in place, Chile, Mexico, Brazil,
Peru, and Colombia began to move toward an inflation-targeting
framework. As the first three countries are the ones whose experiences
are better documented, in the rest of paper I will focus on them. Chile
started in 1990 a gradual transition where an inflation-targeting
framework coincided with a crawling exchange rate band. In 1999,
once the effects of the 1998 international financial crisis receded,
Chilean authorities decided to abandon the exchange rate target zone
and let their currency float. Mexico also underwent a gradual transi-
tion toward inflation targeting since the adoption of the floating
exchange rate in December 1994. On the other hand, Brazil
embraced a full-fledged inflation-targeting framework immediately
after the devaluation of the real in 1999 as a way to generate sufficient
confidence in the new regime to avoid the inflationary effects of the
currency movement.40 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
In an environment of greater fiscal discipline, the adoption of a
floating exchange rate regime, together with inflation targeting, works
toward re-establishing the role of monetary policy as an additional
policy instrument given that:
(1) It frees monetary policy from the constraint of defending the
exchange rate and allows it to be carried out, taking into account both
domestic and foreign variables to achieve price stability.
(2) It provides an additional adjustment variable that can respond
to shocks.
(3) It eliminates the implicit exchange rate insurance and, thus,
provides less incentives for the generation of currency mismatches
among assets and liabilities.
However, to fulfill these tasks, to minimize the costs associated with
a flexible exchange rate regime, and to have an inflation-targeting
regime where the targets work properly by anchoring expectations,
there are several prerequisites that need to be met:
(1) The history of high inflation implies that the most important
challenge facing the monetary authority is to establish its credibility.
The public needs to be confident that the central bank will react in
order to attain its targets, countering inflationary pressures that would
lead to deviations. Building credibility is a process that takes several
years. The inflation-targeting framework stresses the importance of
increasing transparency and improving communication with the public
to strengthen trust.5 The continuous fulfillment of the targets is an
important factor to accelerate the recovery of credibility.
(2) Given that, in the past, monetary policy was constrained by the
exchange rate regime, the technical tools to conduct monetary policy
were underdeveloped. Therefore, increasing the understanding of the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy is crucial to assess the
effect of monetary policy in the economy, the speed of the response,
make inflation forecasts, and carry out a proactive monetary policy. 
(3) To minimize exchange rate mismatches and, therefore, to be
in a situation in which exchange rate volatility does not lead to finan-
cial vulnerability, there is the need to develop markets to ensure these
risks. There are two markets that need to be developed. The first is a
derivatives market that allows firms to hedge exchange rate risk. The
second is a long-term domestic debt market, so firms are able toECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 41
obtain long-term funding in domestic currency. Both are clearly com-
plementary in order to allow firms to reduce currency and maturity
mismatches at minimum cost.
As a result of the changes mentioned in the macroeconomic frame-
work of these countries, inflation has fallen sharply in most of them and
the attainment of price stability is in sight.
The remainder of the paper discusses the main hurdles (mentioned
before) that had to be overcome to accomplish this task and stresses how
in 2000-2002 we have already seen the first examples of a countercycli-
cal monetary policy in some of these countries. Finally, I will conclude
with some challenges that monetary authorities face in Latin America.
II. RE-ESTABLISHING MONETARY POLICY AS AN
ADDITIONAL POLICY INSTRUMENT
As was mentioned in the introduction, there are several hurdles that
monetary authorities had to overcome to re-establish monetary policy
as a useful stabilization tool. In this section I will go into more detail on
how we are dealing with these issues.
Restoring credibility
The monetary authority’s credibility regarding its inflation targets
and its resolve to meet them are crucial elements to:
(1) Increase the effectiveness of monetary policy to achieve its goals.
(2) Reduce the costs of the disinflation effort.
(3) Allow monetary policy to function as a countercyclical tool.
The first two points hinge on the fact that monetary policy actions
affect price-setting behavior through the “transmission mechanism.”
One of the main components of the mechanism, as we all know, are
expectations, given that current monetary policy actions only affect
short-term interest rates, but aggregate demand is influenced also by the
evolution of long-term interest rates, other asset prices, the real
exchange rate, etc. These prices depend, to a large extent, on expecta-
tions of future policy actions. In addition, wage and price-setting
behavior is influenced by the public’s perception about future price42 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
behavior and monetary policy actions. Therefore, the more credible and
predictable monetary policy is, the more effective it becomes and, thus,
the social cost of the disinflationary process falls.
Regarding the third point, it is useful to split the discussion of coun-
tercyclical monetary policy actions on how the authority should react to
demand and supply shocks. In the first case, there is no conflict between
the actions needed to achieve the inflation target and those needed to
smooth the business cycle, given that inflationary pressures arise as
output is above its long-run potential. Thus, the policy prescription of
tightening monetary conditions helps to reduce inflation and return
output to its long-run equilibrium level. However, when confronted
with a negative supply shock, the monetary authority faces the typical
tradeoff between achieving the inflation target or partially counteracting
the negative effect of the shock on output. In this situation, when the
targets are credible, the increase in inflation will tend to be perceived as
transitory, and the authority will be able to pursue its smoothing role
without concerns that the temporary deviation of inflation from the
target would feed into medium-term inflation expectations.
For these reasons, it was crucial that monetary authorities, at the
time of adoption of inflation targets, gained the public’s trust. At the
same time, the inflation-targeting framework was adopted with this aim,
making significant efforts in the areas of transparency and communica-
tion. Also, hitting the inflation targets and running the risk of
undershooting the targets was essential to accelerate the recovery of cred-
ibility. When there is less than full credibility, the policy reaction
function should be asymmetric, given that the cost of overshooting the
target goes beyond the typical quadratic loss that we put in our models
due to the additional cost associated with a loss of trust.6 Some technical
papers have found that the credibility of the targets has improved signif-
icantly in Chile, Mexico, and Brazil, and that inflation expectations have
become less dependent of transitory inflationary shocks.7 However, due
to the asymmetric policy response I mentioned earlier, ex post, the
targets were achieved by a comfortable margin in Mexico since 1999.
In addition to the econometric exercises done by other authors, it is
useful to provide a graphical proof of how expected inflation has been
converging to the future inflation targets as these have been met. To this
effect, Chart 1 shows the evolution of inflation and the targets andECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 43
Chart 2 shows inflation expectations for the next twelve months and
the twelve months ahead inflation target for Mexico and Chile. It is
clear how, in both cases, as the targets have been met, inflation expecta-
tions have become more similar to the targets.
Another consequence of the increase in credibility is the weakening
of the pass-through from exchange rate movements to inflation that has
taken place in these economies (more on this in section III).
The transmission channels and the disinflation strategy
To carry out an independent monetary policy in the context of a
flexible exchange rate and an inflation-targeting regime, it is useful to
develop macroeconomic models to understand the inflation process,
evaluate the effect of monetary policy on the economy, and make
inflation forecasts. 
In consequence, the central banks of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have
been developing models and undertaking research to assess the trans-
mission channels of monetary policy.8 This is a challenging endeavor
for several reasons.
First, changes in regime may affect the relationship between instru-
ments, transmission channels, GDP, and prices due to Lucas
Critique-type of arguments. For instance, the causes and effects of a
change in interest rates are likely to be different under a floating
exchange rate regime than under a fixed one. So, historical estimations
of the effect of monetary policy can be misleading. Second, the
economy has been changing rapidly because of both internal and exter-
nal factors, independently of the changes in monetary policy regime.
For example, past structural reforms are consolidating, old bargaining
structures are changing because of political and social changes, interna-
tional integration of goods and financial markets continues, and there is
technological innovation in the financial sector.9 Third, in several
instances, data that is relevant to evaluate conditions in the economy are
of poor quality or even nonexistent.
Finally, the structural changes in these economies imply that
equilibrium values of key variables may be evolving over time, such
as the growth rate of potential output, the noninflationary rate of44 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 1
INFLATION, EXPECTED INFLATION, AND INFLATION
TARGET IN MEXICO (ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE)
Source: Inflation and targets are from the Bank of Mexico. Expected inflation is obtained from the
Monthly Survey of Private Sector Analysts conducted by the Bank of Mexico.
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Chart 2
INFLATION, EXPECTED INFLATION, AND INFLATION
TARGET IN CHILE (ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE)
Source: Inflation and targets are from the Central Bank of Chile. Expected inflation is obtained from
the difference between nominal interest rates and the Unidad de Fomento indexed (real) interest
rates of equivalent maturity.
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unemployment, and the equilibrium levels of the real interest rate and
the real exchange rate. In this context, it is not easy to judge whether a
variable is converging or deviating from its long-run equilibrium value.
These uncertainties are particularly important for both Brazil and
Mexico, given the more recent structural changes and episodes of
balance of payments or banking crises and high inflation. In Chile,
many of the most significant structural reforms were made two decades
ago, and it has not been subject to a major crisis, leading to an acceler-
ation of inflation since the period 1982-1983. This has allowed the
Central Bank of Chile to have a clearer view about what the fundamen-
tal relationships are between different variables and a more precise
estimation of the effects of monetary policy. In contrast, the changes in
the Brazilian and Mexican economies imply that model developers
often have to use more calibration and guesswork in their models, given
the present instability in econometric estimates.
The empirical work that has been done in the three Latin American
countries shows that the transmission channels are qualitatively the
same as in industrial countries, though their quantitative importance
varies, conditioned by the degree of financial penetration, credibility,
and trade openness in the economy.10 The three main channels are: (1)
an interest rate and credit channel that affect aggregate demand and
through it wages and the prices of nontradable goods; (2) a capital flow
channel that affects the level of the exchange rate, in turn influencing
directly the prices of tradable goods and indirectly those of nontradables
because of the effect of a more appreciated real exchange rate on aggre-
gate demand; and (3) an expectations channel that affects the
determination of wages and prices directly, as well as asset prices. 
In the case of Brazil and Mexico, the effect of interest rates on eco-
nomic activity through the interest rate and credit channel affecting
aggregate demand is likely to be lower compared with industrial coun-
tries or in Chile, given the more limited development of the financial
sector (Table 1). Thus, larger interest rate adjustments would be needed
to see equivalent changes in economic activity and prices of nontradable
goods, as those observed in industrialized countries or in Chile.11
On the other hand, Mexico and Chile are fairly open economies,
with trade representing 62 percent and 61 percent of GDP respec-
tively in the period 1997-2001 (Table 1). In addition, their levels ofECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 47
development imply that tradable goods account for a larger propor-
tion of the CPI, so the influence of interest rates on the exchange rate
may translate into significant effects on prices of tradable goods and
the CPI. Nevertheless, the relationship between movements in the
exchange rate and prices has historically been larger in the three coun-
tries than would be justified by their degree of openness and
development. That is because in economies with high inflation, the
nominal exchange rate is also a leading indicator of inflationary pres-
sures, and changes in this variable were often taken as a lack of
commitment by the central bank with price stability. 
In contrast, in more stable economies the pass-through tends to be
lower, irrespective of the degree of openness, because of several factors.
First, expectations and contracts are anchored at low levels of inflation
and are not affected by exchange rate movements. Second, a significant
part of the changes in costs of imported goods is absorbed by the profit
margins of distributors. Finally, the type of shocks leading to move-
ments in exchange rates are more predominantly real shocks, not
nominal ones. For example, if there is a terms-of-trade shock that leads
to a fall in output and aggregate demand, a depreciation of the
exchange rate should have a small effect on prices. In contrast, a depre-
ciation that corresponds to a looser stance of monetary policy or a
decline in the demand for the country’s assets—when the economy is
growing at its potential—should have a larger effect on prices.
Table 1
BANKING SECTOR CREDIT AND TRADE AS
PROPORTIONS OF GDP: AVERAGE 1997-2001
(PERCENTAGE)
United
Brazil Chile Mexico States Canada Germany* France*
Banking sector 
credit/GDP 33.8 60.4 16.3 67.6 67.2 58.0 41.9
Trade/GDP 22.6 60.5 62.0 24.3 82.5 23.3 16.5
* Trade outside the European Union.
Source: Trade to GDP was obtained from the OECD for industrial countries and from national sta-
tistical offices of the three Latin American countries. Banking-sector credit was obtained from the
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Summarizing, Chile’s transmission channels are likely to be similar
to those of a country like Canada, with significant financial penetra-
tion, a very open economy but an already low pass-through given the
consolidation of low inflation. The case of Brazil is one in which both
the interest rate and credit channel and the exchange rate channel are
relatively weak. The Mexican case is between these two extremes, with a
relatively weak effect on aggregate demand from the interest rate and
credit channel, and a stronger exchange rate channel, though its impor-
tance seems to have diminished. 
The adoption of an inflation-targeting framework in the three
countries should lead to a reduction in the relationship between
exchange rates and prices, and increase the role of expectations. Past sta-
bilization programs in Latin America were typically based on
maintaining the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, so this variable
played both a direct role affecting prices of tradable goods and an indi-
rect role, as expectations were anchored around its level so movements
in this variable affected all the prices in the economy. With inflation tar-
geting, the short- and medium-run targets are the new nominal
anchors. This implies that even though the inflation-targeting scheme
was initially applied in industrial countries, it is of particular relevance
for emerging markets countries that are following a disinflationary
process. In addition to the substitution of the exchange rate as a
nominal anchor, the establishment of a long-term target and an increase
in transparency are of particular importance in order to avoid shocks
driven by expectations and confidence crises, as those observed histori-
cally in many emerging markets.12
There is another particular element that conditioned the disinfla-
tionary strategy followed in the three countries. As in industrial
countries, there are important labor market rigidities, related with con-
tracts and costs of adjusting the amount of employment in a firm, that
imply that monetary conditions in the economy translate into wage
adjustments with a significant lag. However, high past levels of inflation
implied that the necessary adjustment in nominal wage increases was
much larger than any seen recently in industrial countries. In addition,
high inflation also led to significant wage and contract indexation, espe-
cially in Brazil and Chile, introducing an additional element of inflation
inertia. Finally, past inflation might have made workers accustomed toreceiving large nominal wage increases, creating “money illusion.” In
the case of Mexico, important real wage increases have been observed
during the last four years, whereas the years of high inflation with
higher nominal increases implied significant real losses for workers. Yet
occasionally, under the new low-inflation environment, nominal wage
increases that imply real increases are rejected for being “too low.”
However, this is another area where the establishment of inflation
targets and the importance of credibility can have a substantial contri-
bution, as both firms and workers internalize the targets when
negotiating nominal wage increases. Otherwise, firms know that a lax
stance when negotiating wages in a low-inflation environment can
imply a sharp erosion of profit margins.
The existence of price and wage rigidities and the need to build
credibility imply that emerging-market central banks need to follow a
very proactive communication strategy that includes publishing quar-
terly reports, giving constant public speeches, and scheduling meetings
with both managers or owners of firms, trade unions, and political
leaders. The objective is to generate a sharper coordination of expecta-
tions around the targets, reducing the costs of attaining the disinflation. 
How does the need to build credibility and the characteristics of the
transmission channels condition the strategy for disinflation? It turns
out that there are several elements that would call for different speeds
and degrees of aggressiveness for reducing inflation. There are three
main elements that justify a more gradual process.
First, there is a tradeoff between the benefits of lower inflation and
the costs associated with its reduction. To minimize the latter due to the
presence of rigid wages and a lack of credibility, it is convenient to
follow a gradual process of adjustment. 
Second, it is relatively easy to reduce inflation quickly based on
anchoring the exchange rate and, thus, engineering a reduction in the
prices of tradable goods. However, past stabilization processes in Latin
America and elsewhere have shown that disinflationary efforts based
mainly on the exchange rate frequently translate to an increase in
external vulnerabilities that ultimately leads to a crisis and a loss of past
stabilization achievements. Thus, a successful stabilization of inflation
needs to be based on a balanced approach, allowing for an adjustment
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of expectations and the prices of both tradable and non-tradable
goods. The adjustment in expectations and nontradable goods takes
longer to engineer.
Finally, as mentioned, there are important uncertainties about the
relative strengths of the different transmission channels of monetary
policy due to the important structural changes that have been observed
in the economy and the monetary policy regime. This implies that there
needs to be a continuous re-evaluation of the strength of the different
channels and of the effects of the monetary instruments. It would be
rash in such a context to follow very extreme policies. 
This last argument was formalized by Brainard (1967). He found
that a prudent monetary policy should be followed when facing uncer-
tainty about policy multipliers.13 In the case of emerging markets, the
argument is compounded with respect to that noted by Brainard, as
there is parameter, information, and structural uncertainty. Therefore,
taking these uncertainties into account, the recommendation would be
that policymakers should compute the magnitude and direction of the
change in the monetary instrument and then do less.14
However, when credibility is at stake, it is difficult to follow an
extremely gradual approach and a very cautious strategy. The need to
build credibility implies that the disinflationary process needs to work
as a signal of the commitment of the central bank with price stability.
Therefore, the response of monetary policy to shocks should be forceful
to guarantee the attainment of the targets, and the disinflation implicit
in the targets needs to be substantial. 
As a result of the previous considerations, authorities needed to strike
a balance between both concerns. Thus, a gradual disinflation process was
established in terms of progressively smaller targets for inflation. But once
these were established, credibility was pursued by complying strictly with
them by reacting aggressively to potential inflationary pressures that
would generate permanent deviations from the targets.
The gradual strategy was followed in the three countries, while the
need to avoid any upward deviation from the targets has been particu-
larly emphasized in Chile and Mexico. In Brazil, inflation was reduced
fairly quickly from a level of 5,000 percent in 1994 to 2.5 percent in
1998, in the context of the exchange-rate-based “Plan Real.” It then
increased to 8.4 percent in 1999 as a result of the devaluation of theECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 51
real, falling gradually to close to 5 percent in 2000. However, it has
been pushed up again by a series of negative price shocks. In the case of
Chile and Mexico, inflation has fallen gradually but steadily. Chilean
inflation was reduced from 30 percent to 3 percent in ten years, while
in Mexico it fell from 52 percent to 5 percent in six years. In both coun-
tries, core inflation has been below the target for the last three years, and
it is likely that this will again be seen in 2002. These results also show
that an exchange rate anchor is not necessary to attain price stability in
emerging markets.
Developing financial markets
There can be instances when financial developments reduce the
effectiveness of monetary policy and impose restrictions on the actions
of the central bank. There are four of these issues that are of particular
relevance in Latin America: (1) a low level of domestic financial devel-
opment or a process of disintermediation that reduces the effectiveness
of monetary policy through the aggregate demand and credit channels,
though a response to changes in opportunity costs is always present; (2)
liability dollarization that leads to an excessive monetary reaction to
exchange rate movements; (3) weakness in financial intermediaries that
may imply problems in the banking sector when the stance of policy is
changed;15 and (4) the possibility of perverse debt dynamics arising
from a tightening of policy when, for example, a large proportion of
public debt is at variable interest rates,16 so a confidence crisis may
ensue.17 Therefore, an additional objective of the authorities should be
further consolidation of the credit channel, increasing the amount of
intermediation in the domestic financial sector, and giving proper
incentives to limit currency and maturity mismatches.
In the Mexican case, the balance of payments crisis of 1994-1995
translated into a deep banking-sector crisis, as conditions in the
economy were such that the number of non-performing loans increased
substantially and bank capital was eroded. Decisive actions were carried
out to support the banks, being fully successful in that no bank runs
were observed during this period and there was no need to impose
capital controls. However, there has not been a sustained recovery in
bank lending to the private sector. 52 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
There are several causes that have limited the recovery of the
banking sector. On the supply side, banks needed to replenish their
level of risk-adjusted capital and, thus, invested mostly in government
bonds that, during a large part of the period, were high-return, low-risk
instruments. In addition, the crisis episode made it clear that institu-
tional characteristics of the credit market made it very difficult to
recover loan guarantees and that bankruptcy problems took a long time
to solve. It might also have been the case that the relatively high real
interest rates that were maintained during the period limited the
demand for loans. 
These three issues were recently addressed. Banks have progressed
in their recapitalization, with the ratio of capital to risk-adjusted assets
standing at 15.05 percent as of March 2002. Two legal reforms oriented
toward easing collateral recoveries and making bankruptcy procedures
more expedient were made in 2000. Finally, real interest rates on gov-
ernment bonds have remained at levels below 4 percent since
mid-2001, their lowest levels since these were initially issued at the
beginning of the 1980s. This implies that the structural conditions that
would allow for a credit recovery seem to be in place, at least since mid-
2001. However, the recent deceleration in economic activity has led to
a reduction in the demand for credit. It will be necessary to wait for
stronger evidence of economic recovery to be sure that past reforms
were sufficient to guarantee a recovery in bank loans.
There has been progress on other components of the Mexican
financial system. In particular, the reform to the pension system
toward individual accounts implies that the amount of resources
invested in capital markets will steadily increase. The amount of
resources intermediated through individual retirement accounts has
increased to almost 5 percent of GDP as of July 2002 and is expected
to increase at a rate of approximately 1 percent of GDP per year. In
addition, a long-term domestic bond market has been developed, ini-
tially trading only with government bonds but increasingly being used
by nonfinancial firms to obtain long-term resources in domestic cur-
rency for investment and by financial companies to provide long-term
loans, such as mortgages. So far, the outstanding value of private-sector
bonds has reached more than $6 billion. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 53
In terms of liability dollarization, it is likely that the three countries,
and particularly Brazil and Mexico, are currently in a transition process
toward lower levels of foreign indebtedness.18 Previously, high levels of
debt denominated in foreign currency responded in an important way
to the implicit insurance associated with the fixed exchange rates that
were in place. The disappearance of these makes foreign financing less
attractive, as firms have to recognize the currency risk associated with
such operations. Consequently, in Mexico the ratio of foreign debt to
assets fell by 4.5 percentage points from 1994 to 2000 for nonexporting
firms listed in the stock market, while it remained virtually constant for
exporting firms. The ratio of exports to debt in dollars has increased
substantially, from 2 percent in 1994 to 7 percent in 2000, suggesting
that firms are maintaining a less-exposed position to currency risk.19
Therefore, the change to a flexible exchange rate regime is generat-
ing an automatic recomposition of liabilities. However, the incentives
provided by the regime should be complemented by other actions. A
derivatives market needs to be developed to allow firms to hedge the
risk derived from the financing obtained from diversified sources.20 In
addition, the lack of long-term domestic debt markets implied that
firms either had a currency or a maturity mismatch with respect to the
assets bought with the financing. The development of a long-term debt
market should contribute to solve this problem.21
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PASS-THROUGH AND
THE MONETARY POLICY RESPONSE IN PRACTICE
In this section, I comment briefly on the fact that the exchange rate
pass-through, an important constraint to the implementation of an
independent monetary policy, has weakened in the last couple of years.
I also look at the effect that this phenomenon, together with the
improvements in credibility and the success in the stabilization process,
has had on the policy reaction function.54 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The exchange rate pass-through and exchange rate shocks
Historical estimations of the exchange rate pass-through indicate
that this had been high and quick in the case of the three countries.
Chart 3 shows the evolution of annual inflation and depreciation rates
for the three countries, and it is evident that there was a very strong
link. As mentioned, this was due both to the direct effect of exchange
rate movements on prices of tradable goods and on the role of nominal
anchor that the exchange rate had played historically.
Such high pass-through imposes several restrictions on monetary
policy, particularly on the ability to let the exchange rate respond to
shocks and, thus, having a well-functioning floating exchange rate
regime. If movements in the exchange rate have such a strong effect on
prices, the central bank will need to respond strongly in order to limit
their inflationary impact, even if there is no explicit exchange rate
target. If the private sector expects this reaction, then it will behave as if
the exchange rate fluctuations that the central bank is willing to allow
are limited, and, thus, the incentives for proper liability management
are dented. In addition, the exchange rate won’t be allowed to respond
fully to counter shocks.
Fortunately, there are several good theoretical reasons to expect the
pass-through to have fallen in the three countries during the recent
period. First, the transition from an exchange-rate-based monetary
policy to an inflation-targeting framework implies that the signaling role
on the stance of monetary policy played by the nominal exchange rate in
the past is substituted by the targets and explicit actions of monetary
policy. Second, the fact that the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate, and
it both appreciates and depreciates, implies that prices setters are more
likely to wait to adjust their prices until they have better information
about whether a given change is permanent or transitory. Third, increas-
ing competitiveness in the economy implies that price setters are less able
to pass to consumers increases in costs of imported inputs.22
Empirically, there is strong evidence to support this hypothesis.
Chart 4 shows the evolution of annual inflation and depreciation rates
during the most recent period. The exchange rates in Brazil and Chile
have depreciated very significantly with little or no effect on prices. The
evidence is not as strong in the Mexican case, as there have been noECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 55
Chart 3
HISTORICAL SERIES OF ANNUAL INFLATION AND
DEPRECIATION RATES IN BRAZIL, CHILE, AND
MEXICO (PERCENTAGE POINTS)*
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Chart 4
RECENT EVOLUTION OF ANNUAL INFLATION AND
DEPRECIATION RATES IN BRAZIL, CHILE, AND
MEXICO (PERCENTAGE POINTS)*
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wide fluctuations in the exchange rate during the last four years, when
the average value of the exchange rate has been $9.44 pesos/dollar and
has fluctuated between -3 percent and 7 percent of this value. However,
on those occasions when the exchange rate has moved, the speed of dis-
inflation has not been affected. 
The graphical evidence can be supported by a simple econometric
exercise. The effect of the annual depreciation rate on annual inflation
rates was estimated for the three Latin American countries, as well as
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, using a sample that begins in the
early 1980s and also for two subsamples. The first of these covers most of
the 1980s and early 1990s, and the second subsample starts in the 1990s
and ends in 2002. The results are quite striking. The pass-through coef-
ficient falls in a very important way for all Latin American countries
from the earlier subperiod to the latter one. Something very similar
happens in Canada, which has very similar coefficients to Chile,23 while
Australia and New Zealand have much smaller coefficients for the whole
period and both subsamples. Thus, the countries in the Western Hemi-
sphere have been converging with the two in Oceania.
Table 2
RESULTS FROM A REGRESSION OF THE ANNUAL
INFLATION RATE ON THE ANNUAL DEPRECIATION
RATE24
Country and Coefficient on exchange Country and Coefficient on exchange
sample period rate depreciation sample period rate depreciation
1) Brazil 4) Australia
1982-2002 1.187*** 1980-2002 .009
1982-1995 1.193*** 1980-1990 .021
1996-2002 -.035 1991-2002 .004
2) Chile 5) Canada
1982-2002 .216*** 1980-2002 -.114
1982-1994 .151*** 1980-1990 .202*
1995-2002 -.192*** 1991-2002 -.152***
3) Mexico 6) New Zealand
1980-2002 .583*** 1980-2002 .029
1980-1996 .542*** 1980-1990 .006
1997-2002 .316*** 1991-2002 -.020
*Significant at 10 percent.
***Significant at 1 percent.58 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The monetary policy response
During the period 1998-2002, there were several episodes that
required important decisions in terms of the implementation of mone-
tary policy. It is interesting to highlight the different policy reactions to
the 1998-1999 and the 2001 shocks, both in Mexico and Chile, and
the acceleration of aggregate demand observed in Mexico during 2000.
In 1998, the strong financial contagion and concerns with a strong
pass-through led to a significant tightening of monetary conditions in
both countries, a procylical response. However, in 2000, policy was
tightened in Mexico in response to a potential overheating of the
economy. Finally, in 2001-2002 the absence of financial contagion
allowed the monetary authorities in Chile and Mexico to reduce inter-
est rates and follow more countercyclical policies, even in periods of
exchange rate depreciation.25
Charts 5 and 6 show the level of short-term real interest rates, the
inflation gap, the output gap, and exchange rate movements in Chile
and Mexico, respectively. The shocks in 1998-1999 were associated
with the contagion arising from the Russian and Brazilian crisis, which
led to an important depreciation of the currency and an increase in the
inflation gap in Mexico, and a depreciation of the Chilean peso. In both
economies, there was a sharp interest rate response to limit the effects
from the depreciation on prices, as well as to counter what were consid-
ered as speculative pressures not responding to fundamentals. To some
extent during this period, the consideration of financial contagion and
the assumption of a high pass-through translated into an important
policy tightening that produced a procyclical response, as the original
shock had a negative effect on output. 
A first example of countercyclical monetary policy is the one seen
in Mexico in 2000. During this year, the economy grew by almost 6.6
percent, but, more importantly, aggregate demand was growing at a
substantially higher rate (10.5 percent). This had the potential of
translating into future inflationary pressures, so monetary policy
reacted, leading to a substantial increase in interest rates, even though
inflation at the moment was in a declining trend and the objective for
the year was attained.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 59
Chart 5
CHILE: REAL INTEREST RATE, INFLATION GAP, 
OUTPUT GAP, AND EXCHANGE RATE DEPRECIATION
(IN PERCENT: THREE MONTHS MOVING AVERAGE)*
* The data are from each country’s central bank.
Real interest rate and inflation gap
Real interest rate and output gap
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Chart 6
MEXICO: REAL INTEREST RATE, INFLATION GAP, 
OUTPUT GAP, AND EXCHANGE RATE DEPRECIATION
(IN PERCENT: THREE MONTHS MOVING AVERAGE)*
* The data are from each country’s central bank.
Real interest rate and inflation gap
Real interest rate and output gap
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In the period 2001-2002 there was an increase in the ability of the
monetary authorities in Mexico and Chile to carry out a countercycli-
cal monetary policy when the economy was subject to negative shocks.
The worldwide deceleration of economic activity observed during
2001 impacted the Mexican and Chilean economies in a negative and
significant way. However, for the first time in the last thirty years in
Mexico, an external shock of this magnitude did not translate into
extreme volatility of financial variables, a balance of payments crisis,
and a deep recession. After a period of three decades, Mexico experi-
enced a normal business cycle, such as those observed in industrial
economies. This is a reflection of the increased credibility attained by
the monetary and fiscal authorities as well as the new economic condi-
tions of the Mexican economy. 
The Bank of Mexico was able to ease monetary conditions in
response to the shock, with real rates falling from 10 percent at the
beginning of the year to 1.3 percent at the end. This was due to the
recognition that the negative effect of the external shock on domestic
conditions would lead to a reduction in inflationary pressures. In the
past, with lower credibility, the move could have been interpreted as
the central bank responding to objectives other than inflation, due to
particular interests in the bank or to outside pressures. However, the
stable evolution of the exchange rate and interest rates implies that it
was interpreted correctly as a response to a change in the determinants
of inflation. The Chilean experience shows a very similar and more
extreme countercyclical response. As can be seen in Chart 5, in 2001
and 2002 there was a very large depreciation and a significant reduc-
tion in interest rates. The movements of these two variables obviously
help to partially compensate the negative output effects of the world-
wide slowdown.
Thus, after a very long period, the Bank of Mexico and the Central
Bank of Chile were able to respond successfully to shocks in particular
by easing policy in response to a negative external shock instead of
having to tighten it in order to counter confidence problems. However,
it should be noted that credibility is still fragile, particularly in Mexico.
This is due to the fact that the credibility of the monetary policy is also
conditioned by the institutional environment in the country. Specifi-
cally, structurally fragile public finances and the lack of political62 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
agreements to strengthen them impose severe constraints on the ability
of the central bank to maintain price stability. At a minor level, the gov-
ernment may need to increase public prices by decree. At a larger level,
high public debt to GDP may curtail the ability of the central bank to
modify monetary conditions because of the perverse debt dynamics that
were mentioned earlier, specially if the debt is indexed to the exchange
rate or has variable interest rates. In an extreme case, this could lead to a
balance of payments crisis. The Central Bank of Brazil is currently
facing such an environment.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The adoption of a floating exchange rate regime and an inflation-
targeting strategy posed several challenges to central banks in Latin
America. In particular, after a history of high inflation and predeter-
mined exchange rate regimes, monetary authorities needed to
re-establish their credibility and substitute the traditional exchange rate
anchors for credible inflationary goals. To accomplish this, countries
followed a strategy that emphasizes the understanding of the transmis-
sion mechanism to sustain monetary policy decisions and the
strengthening of transparency and communication with the public to
build credibility. The available evidence suggests that this strategy has
been successful so far as inflation has converged, or is close to doing so,
to price stability in many of these economies.
In the following years, our understanding of how our economies
work under price stability, a phenomenon that has not been seen in
many decades, will provide important information to keep updating
our monetary policy framework, further improving the effectiveness of
monetary policy.
In particular for the case of Mexico, agents and policymakers
should learn to live in a low-inflation environment. On the part of the
monetary policy authority, the policy response should become more
symmetric and gradual. In addition, the regional experience with low
inflation will provide useful evidence to assess what is the appropriate
definition of price stability for developing countries.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 63
On the part of the public, it is important to consolidate the notion
that irrespective of short-term inflation deviations due to exchange rate
movements, the authority will deliver an inflation rate that, on average,
is equal to the target. Therefore, long-run inflation expectations should
be anchored around that level, and prices and wages should be based on
this expectation. 
Finally, the institutional framework in which a central bank oper-
ates is of the utmost importance. Fragility in public finances,
compounded by a lack of political agreements to strengthen them,
implies that the costs and difficulties from attaining and consolidating
economic stability are much larger. More work is needed in Latin
America in this respect.64 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1Although there are some studies that clearly document the procyclical role
of fiscal policy in Latin America, (for example Gavin and Perotti (1997), and
Vegh and Talvi (1996)), there is no study that focuses on the pro or countercycli-
cal nature of monetary policy in the region.
2 Stiglitz (2002) has criticized both the IMF and emerging-market govern-
ments for backing procyclical policies in response to negative shocks. However,
this criticism does not take into account that many of these episodes were charac-
terized by severe confidence crises, in response to which authorities needed to fol-
low tight monetary and fiscal policies.
3 The so-called “Washington consensus.”
4 The lack of consolidation is explained in most cases by the inability to cre-
ate the political consensus necessary to carry out additional reforms. These have
been especially elusive in those countries where a large proportion of spending is
determined at the state level, as each state governor has incentives to see the gov-
ernment’s budget as a public good and knows that a purely individual attempt at
adjustment has scant chance of success while it carries important political costs. 
5 Credibility is also a prerequisite in order to be able to carry out counter-
cyclical fiscal policy. Agents must be willing to believe that an increase in the
budget deficit is temporary and only seeks to smooth the business cycle, not a
more permanent deterioration in public finances that can lead to an unsustain-
able debt trajectory. 
6 As Almeida and Goodhart (1998), and Bernanke and others (1999) have
found, the adoption of inflation targets has led to a reduction of inflation expec-
tations but only gradually. This suggests that the process of confidence building is
a difficult and lengthy one and might even be asymmetrical. If it is easier to lose
credibility than to win it, authorities have to be particularly careful at the time
when this is being built.
7 Specifically, the following results have been found for the three countries:
(1) the inflation target has become a more important determinant of inflation
expectations; (2) it has become easier to predict inflation, and this last variable
has converged toward the targets; (3) the sensitivity of core inflation and inflation
expectations to general consumer price inflation shocks has become smaller.
Some of the papers reporting these results include: Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2001); Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001); Corbo, Landerrechte, and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2001); and Schmidt-Hebbel and Werner (2002).
8 For examples of the types of models that have been developed, see García
and others (2002) for Chile; Springer and Kfoury (2001) for Brazil; and Mar-
tinez, Messmacher, and Werner (2002) for Mexico.
9 For reviews of the reform process in Mexico, see Lustig (1998); in a general
Latin American framework see Edwards (1995); and in Mexico’s financial sector
see Ortíz (1994).
10 See, for example, Bogdanski, Tombini, and Werlang (2000) for Brazil;
Cabrera y Lagos (2000) for Chile; and Martinez, Sanchez and Werner (2000) in
the Mexican case.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 65
11 However, the disparities observed in terms of banking credit to GDP exag-
gerate the differences in terms of the effects on consumption and investment of
higher interest rates, as an opportunity cost always arises from higher rates. Thus,
the amount of retained earnings allocated to fixed investment, trade credit from
firms, and the supply of loans by retailers to customers are likely to fall. 
12 The vulnerability of these countries to confidence crises is implicit evi-
dence of the importance of the expectations channel in these economies. 
13 These considerations are also important in industrial countries, as noted
by Blinder (1998).
14 In the case of changes in variables, when there is uncertainty about
whether they respond to a shock that has changed its equilibrium value, such as
the real exchange rate, the authority needs first to evaluate the different effects
that a convergence to or a deviation from the equilibrium would have and
observe the available information carefully to make a diagnosis about the adjust-
ment. For example, a depreciation in the equilibrium real exchange rate should
lead to an adjustment in the relative prices of tradable and nontradable goods,
but not to inflationary pressures in the nontradable sector.
15 Financial fragility of banks after the balance of payments and banking
crises of 1995-1996 in Mexico imposed a severe restriction in terms of the scope
of reaction of monetary policy. Sharp increases in interest rates would have wors-
ened the situation of banks, increasing the default rate on loans and, thus, leading
to a larger fall in bank capital and a higher fiscal cost of supporting the sector. In
turn, this could have translated into a larger confidence crisis, even counteracting
the desired effect from the tightening of monetary policy.
16 In the case of Brazil today, a large proportion of domestic public debt is
either at variable interest rates or indexed to the currency. 
17 In the case of debt indexed to foreign currency, an attempt to ease policies
that generates a depreciation of the currency can also lead to the perception that
the country may have problems servicing its debt. 
18 Nevertheless, the extent of liability dollarization and the use of the dollar
for current transactions is surprisingly low in Mexico, in spite of the past balance
of payments crises, episodes of high inflation, and extremely close links with the
United States.
19 See Martinez and Werner (2002) for an extensive analysis of how the
structure of liabilities has changed for Mexican-listed firms. 
20 For a more in-depth discussion about the importance of the development
of a derivatives market and what has occurred in Mexico, see Ortíz (2000).
21 Proponents of dollarization or hard pegs in Latin America, such as Haus-
mann and others (2001), and Calvo (2000), argued that there was an intrinsic
“original sin” in the countries of the region, i.e., it was not possible or too expen-
sive to obtain long-term financing in domestic currency, so a currency or matu-
rity mismatch always appears. The Chilean and Mexican examples indicate that
the “original sin” is not immutable.
22 For recent empirical analysis of the determinants of the pass-through, see
Goldfajn and Werlang (2000), Arias and Messmacher (2002), and Schmidt-
Hebbel and Werner (2002).66 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
23 The negative coefficient in the Chilean and Canadian cases suggests that
in the latter period the exchange responded to real shocks that were affecting the
economy. For example, a reduction in the price of commodities and in the
demand for exports translated into a deceleration of the economy and a deprecia-
tion of the exchange rate. The effect of the economic deceleration dominated any
inflationary pressures arising from the exchange rate adjustment.
24 The regression is of the form: Π t = α 0 + α 1∆ et + ε t, where Π t is the annual
inflation rate and ∆ et is the annual depreciation rate. In the case of the three Latin
American countries, the data has monthly frequency and was obtained from each
central bank. In the case of the three industrial countries, the data have quarterly
frequency and are from the IFS.
25 For an empirical assessment of the policy reaction functions, see Schmidt-
Hebbel and Werner (2002).ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2002 67
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